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LONG-TERM ENERGY FORECASTS

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WHAT CAN HISTORY TEACH US? A Retrospective Examination of Long-Term Energy Forecasts for the United States

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Abstract This paper explores how long-term energy forecasts are created and why they are useful. It focuses on forecasts of energy use in the United States for the year 2000 but considers only long-term predictions, i.e., those covering two or more decades. The motivation is current interest in global warming forecasts, some of which run beyond a century. The basic observation is that forecasters in the 1950--1980 period underestimated the importance of unmodeled surprises. A key example is the failure to foresee the ability of the United States economy to respond to the oil embargos of the 1970s by increasing efficiency. Not only were most forecasts of that period systematically high, but forecasters systematically underestimated uncertainties. Long-term energy forecasts must make assumptions about both technologies and social systems. At their most successful, they influence how people act by showing the consequences of not acting. They are useful when they provide insights to energy planners, influence the perceptions of the public and the energy

policy community, capture current understanding of underlying physical and economic principles, or highlight key emerging social or economic trends.

It is true that at best we see dimly into the future, but those who acknowledge their duty to posterity will feel impelled to use their foresight upon what facts and guiding principles we do possess. Though many data are at present wanting or doubtful, our conclusions may be rendered so far probable as to lead to further inquiries... (1:4)

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper explores how long-term energy forecasts are created and why they are useful. By long-term, we mean forecasts with a time horizon of more than two decades. Measuring the success of such forecasts is much more difficult than assessing the accuracy of models of physical systems. Because human beings change, constantly inventing new technologies and restructuring their social networks, no methodology can consistently forecast future energy demand with accuracy.

A good forecast can illuminate the consequences of action or inaction and thus lead to changes in behavior. Although these changes may invalidate a specific numerical prediction, they emphasize, rather than detract from, the forecast's importance. One may judge a forecast successful if it (a) helps energy planners, (b) influences the perceptions of the public or the energy policy community, (c) captures the current understanding of underlying physical and economic principles, or (d) highlights key emerging social or economic trends.

Energy forecasting has been compared to using automobile headlights, which help drivers avoid obstacles in the road ahead. However, the analogy does not go far enough. It may be a foggy night. The headlights may fail to illuminate adequately the path forward, causing one to miss the sign pointing to the crucial exit from the freeway or notice too late a large rock fallen on the road. Failure to acknowledge imperfections in forecasting can therefore lead to misjudgments.

This paper addresses these issues. We examine the methods available to energy forecasters. We describe a range of methods, demonstrating their strengths and

weaknesses through historical examples. We consider issues of risk, uncertainty, and public perception that influence how forecasts are received and present a number of prescriptions for avoiding the pitfalls and for exploiting the capabilities of the various modeling techniques. Though centered around energy forecasting, our recommendations should apply equally well to any field in which technical and policy concerns interact or decisions have to be made under conditions of extreme uncertainty.

The paper is organized as follows. In this section we discuss why we forecast. Section 2 is a review of the uses of long-range energy forecasts. In Section 3 we summarize major types of long-range energy forecasts and their respective strengths and weaknesses. Section 4 addresses the issues of risk from decisions based on the uncertain forecasts of energy demand. Section 5 discusses the technical quality, public attention, and policy impact of energy forecasts. In Section 6 we present our observations for both the forecasting community and the users of these forecasts. Section 7 summarizes our conclusions.

1.1. Why Do We Forecast?

Forecasts have become an essential tool of modern society. It is hard to imagine a government action or investment decision not based in some way on a forecast. For example, investment decisions in power plants or home insulation are routinely assessed using economic techniques that require assumptions about future energy prices, which depend in part on assumptions about future energy demand. New technologies often come into existence if someone anticipates a market.

Commenting on environmental forecasting, Bella points out that

...changes [in the environment] can be accomplished one at a time as if they were essentially in isolation from each other. Moreover, only a small part of the environment and only a few environmental properties must be understood in order to produce a change. In contrast, to foresee the consequences of change requires that one examine the combined effect of many changes (2:15)

Global climate change is a particularly salient example of an environmental problem whose solution requires very long-range forecasting, imperfect though it may be. At its best forecasting contributes to better social decision-making and minimizes adverse side effects, both direct and indirect.

1.2. What Makes a Good Forecast?

Energy forecasters working in the aftermath of 1970s oil shocks expended enormous effort in projecting future energy trends. Because 2000 is a round number, it was routinely used as an end-point. Today we can look back. As **Figure 1** shows, the forecasts summarized in a review by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) varied enormously (3). Actual U.S. energy use in 2000, which we have superimposed on the graph, was at the very lowest end of the forecasts. Energy use turned out to be lower than was considered plausible by almost every forecaster. The Lovins scenario, discussed below (which is not included in the DOE review) is an exception.




Figure 1 Projections of total U.S. primary energy use from the 1970s. The figure is redrawn from a Department of Energy report (3) and simplified from a summary of dozens of forecasts. Actual use at the end of the century [105 exajoules (4)] is indicated. Forecasters clearly did not anticipate the ability of the economy to limit growth of energy use. Note that the figure suppresses the zero baseline. Sources for the individual curves may be found in Reference 3.

In long-range forecasting "success" is a highly subjective term, and as explained in Section 2, the measure of success hinges on the intended use of the forecast. Long-term forecasts are primarily useful for the perspectives they give to current users at the time the forecasts are freshly generated, not to future users.

Perhaps the most interesting reason why a model might fail is that predicting problems can lead to changes that avoid them. In this sense failure would in fact indicate the success of the model. Much global climate change modeling has the goal of providing information intended to affect the future. As we discuss below, retrospective interviews concluded that some of the forecasts referred to in this article did indeed influence policy (5).

Long-run forecasting models generally assume that there exist underlying structural relationships in the economy that vary in a gradual fashion. The real world, in contrast, is rife with discontinuities and disruptive events, and the longer the time frame of the forecast, the more likely it is that pivotal events will change the underlying economic and behavioral relationships that all models attempt to replicate.

Models always have static components, but except for invariant physical laws, there is nothing static in the economy. Energy forecasting necessarily makes assumptions about human behavior (including social, institutional, and personal) and human innovation. Institutional behavior evolves, individual behavior changes, and pivotal events occur, affecting outcomes in ways we cannot anticipate. Static models cannot keep pace with the long-term evolution of the real world, not just because their data and underlying algorithms are inevitably flawed, but because the world sometimes changes in unpredictable and unforeseeable ways. Further, data are always limited and incomplete. Important characteristics of the energy/economy system may not be measured or are tracked by companies that do not make the data public.

1.3. Long-Range Energy Forecasts Are Not Validatable

Hodges & Dewar (6) distinguish between what they call "validatable" and "nonvalidatable" models. In their terminology, validatable models have the potential to yield predictions of the future in which one can have high confidence. Whereas nonvalidatable models can have many useful features, they are likely to have low precision and unquantifiable errors.

Situations describable by validatable models are characterized by four properties:

1. they must be observable,
2. they must exhibit constancy of structure in time,

3. they must exhibit constancy across variations in conditions not specified in the model, and
4. they must permit collection of ample and accurate data.

In some instances it is possible to forecast precisely and confidently. Astronomical and satellite orbital predictions are a clear example. Satellite orbits can be calculated with enormous precision because orbital mechanics passes these tests. This precision makes possible technologies such as the satellite-based global positioning system.

The fact that a model is validatable does not necessarily mean all properties of the future outcome can be predicted to any desired accuracy. Both quantum mechanics and chaos theory assess and quantify fundamental limits on prediction.

The situations modeled by long-range energy forecasting tools do not meet criteria 2 and 3 in the list above. Consequently, long-range forecasting models are not validatable in Hodges & Dewar's sense.

2. USES OF LONG-RANGE ENERGY FORECASTS

In spite of being nonvalidatable in the sense of Hodges & Dewar (6), long-range forecasting is useful. This section, which combines ideas from Hodges & Dewar (6) and Greenberger (5), discusses why. We observe that accurately forecasting the future does not appear in the discussion.

2.1. Use 1: Bookkeeping Devices

In this use models are a means to condense masses of data and to provide incentives for improving data quality. Consider an energy forecasting model that disaggregates energy use by economic sector, and within each sector by broad end-use category. Using this model to forecast future energy demand, even by trend projections, may point to a lack of good data in some end uses or sectors, thus inducing better data collection. Comparing energy supply data with energy use data may disclose inconsistencies due to reporting errors, overlooked categories, losses, etc. For this purpose a model can be considered useful if it confirms that outputs correctly add up to inputs, or if its use reveals shortcomings in existing data quality and induces improvements in the quality of data collected in the future.

Forecasts that disaggregate to high levels of detail are necessarily complex and data intensive. This type of forecast can only be carried out with large staff and substantial budgets. Such detailed forecasts may be required for applications focusing on details of specific sectors (e.g., assessing sectoral carbon dioxide emissions). One should be careful in using such forecasts, because deeply buried assumptions may drive high-level results in ways that are not easy to understand.

2.2. Use 2: Aids in Selling Ideas or Achieving Political Ends

Within a month of the first oil embargo, President Nixon (then battling Watergate and under pressure to respond aggressively to OPEC cutbacks in production) announced "Project Independence," an energy plan that was claimed would lead to the reduction of U.S. oil imports to zero by 1980 (7). **Figure 2** shows the proposed energy trajectory.¹ As was almost immediately predicted by some energy experts, the goal failed (8). Imports were higher in 1980 than in 1973 (9).




Figure 2 President Nixon's "Project Independence" plan of 1973 to reduce U.S. oil imports to zero by 1980. The plan failed. The quantity plotted is U.S. oil use. The figure has been redrawn and converted to metric units. The original caption read, "Self-sufficiency by 1980 through conservation and expanded production."

¹ This graph had little or no analytical basis. It was a sketch to support a policy goal (P.P. Craig, personal communication)

A more subtle example is shown in **Figure 3**. This is from a 1962 report prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission (10). It was designed to sell nuclear power plants by making the argument for sustained growth in electricity demand. The analysis was based on historic growth rates of total electricity and optimistic projections of the costs of nuclear power. The citation is a Congressional hearing that includes testimony describing the kinds of reasoning used. We discuss some of this reasoning below (see **Figures 4 and 5** and the accompanying discussion). As a result of this optimism, utilities subsidized early nuclear plant orders (often with considerable help from the government, such as the Price Anderson Act limiting liability). Following the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo of 1973 and the oil shock in 1979, electricity growth rates dropped to a few percent per year. The cost of nuclear plants did not decline as predicted, and by the 1980s orders for new plants vanished.




Figure 3 An Atomic Energy Commission forecast from 1962, designed to show demand for nuclear power plants. The curve of interest here shows electricity demand. The authors judgmentally assumed a growing nuclear market share. Actual electricity and nuclear electricity in 2000 is indicated (10).

An analysis may be used to provide an appearance of concern and attention for the benefit of constituents or the general public. It is not uncommon for advocates to cite reports selectively or out of context for promotional purposes. Similarly, studies may be used to provide a cover (“fig leaf”) of technical respectability to a decision actually based on hidden values or self-interest.

Should a policy decision turn out to be ineffective, a politician may try to avoid personal criticism by implicating the analyst. Officials routinely take credit for success but disavow responsibility for failure. A DOE administrator put it this way: “Analysts must learn there is no fame for them in this business” (5).

Studies can be commissioned as a delaying tactic. When all responses look like political losers, a decision-maker may commission an analysis to gain time and maneuverability. As additional facts come to light, the problem might resolve itself or a compromise might be arranged.

Government agencies sometimes commission studies to moderate overly ambitious goals (e.g., as embodied in acts of Congress or presidential proclamations) toward more reasonable expectations.

2.3. Use 3: Training Aids

The applicable measure of success here is the degree to which the forecast can prompt learning and induce desired changes in behavior. The Limits to Growth model (discussed below) has been widely used to help students understand the counterintuitive nature of dynamical systems (11). Simulations and role-playing games have also been used to teach executives in the utility industry how new markets for SO₂ emissions permits or electric power might behave. Experience with exercising these types of models can improve intuition for the behavior of complex systems (12--14).

2.4. Use 4: Automatic Management Systems Whose Efficacy Does Not Require the Model to be a True Representation

Hodges & Dewar use the example of the Kalman filter, which can be used to control (for example) the traffic on freeway on-ramps. These filters can model traffic flow, but only in a stochastic representation that does not pretend to be exact and validated, just useful. Similar filters can also be embedded in management systems controlling power systems or factory processes. As long as the model cost-effectively controls the process in

question, the issue of whether it is an exact representation of reality is not of concern. Neural networks fall into this category (15).

2.5. Use 5: Aids in Communication and Education

By forcing analysts to discuss data and analysis results in a systematic way, forecasting models can facilitate communication between various stakeholders. The measure of success for this use is the degree to which the model improves understanding and communication, both for individuals and between groups with different mindsets and vocabularies.

For example, the population of a developing country at some future time might depend on childhood survival rates, longevity, female literacy, affluence, income distribution, health care, and nutrition. Modeling these influences could permit better understanding of interlinkages between them and improve communication between expert groups with diverse backgrounds. Such a model could inform, for instance, a government's long-term plans. Another example is the U.S. DOE's Energy Information Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook forecast (16). This widely used forecast, based on the EIA's latest analysis of the current data and industry expectations, provides a baseline that others can and do use for their own explorations of the future.

When a problem is being analyzed, word leaks out and leads to suggestions, ideas, and information from outside parties. This can add to the analysis directly, or stimulate helpful complementary work by others. A politician facing a thorny problem might commission a study to locate knowledgeable people. Thus, studies can identify talent as a by-product. The National Academy of Sciences CONAES (Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems) study, one of those assessed in the DOE review of forecasts from the 1970s (**Figure 1**) (5), was directly or indirectly responsible for many career shifts. The American Physical Society "Princeton Study" held during the summer of 1973 was explicitly designed with this intent (17). The oil embargos of the 1970s had led many physicists to think about making career shifts. The study gave them an opportunity to learn about energy issues, to meet and get to know experts, and to find jobs.

2.6 Use 6: To understand the Bounds or Limits on the Range of Possible Outcomes

Models can enhance confidence through limiting or bounding cases. The Princeton Study referred to in Use 5 includes many examples (17). This study emphasized energy

efficiency, with a focus on physical constraints to energy use. The cornerstone of the analysis was the concept of fundamental physical limits such as the first and second laws of thermodynamics. This work showed that great potential existed for improving efficiency by engineering change. Energy efficiency became a major theme of energy policy and remains so to this day.

2.7 Use 7: Aids to Thinking and Hypothesizing

Forecasts can help people and institutions think through the consequences of their actions. Researchers often begin their exercises with baseline or “business-as-usual” forecasts, which attempt to predict how the world will evolve assuming current trends continue. Alternative forecasts are then created to assess the potential effects of changes in key factors on the results. For example, an economic forecaster might use such an analysis to assess the likely effects of a change in property taxes on economic growth in a particular state.

Computer forecasting is an excellent tool to teach people the dynamics of complex systems (12, 13). The behavior of these systems is often counterintuitive, so such forecasting games can help people learn to manage them better. For example, systems dynamics models (described below) were used in the 1960s to explain why building "premium" housing in urban areas can under some plausible circumstances accelerate, rather than slow, migration to suburbs (14:5)¹.

¹ Urban renewal generally seeks to make down-town regions more attractive. Under some circumstances these programs can drive up home prices to the point that they drive away more people than they attract.

Some forecasts are generated as part of scenario exploration exercises, which can be helpful any time a person or institution faces a critical choice. Oil companies, for example, are well aware that at some point the transportation sector may have to switch to some other fuel. Even though this switch may be a long time in the future, the prospect needs to be part of current contingency planning. Considering a wide range of scenarios can help institutions prepare for the many different ways the future can evolve.

Institutions use forecasts to allocate physical and personnel resources. Some businesses have massive infrastructures with long time constants and find it useful to forecast over decades. (18)

3. TYPES OF FORECASTS

Forecasters have available to them a considerable tool kit. Armstrong discussed forecasting techniques in 1978, and two decades later edited the most comprehensive review of forecasting principles of which we are aware (15, 19). Armstrong's handbook discusses and assesses many types of forecasting, including some techniques (e.g., neural nets) not to our knowledge used at all in long-range energy forecasting. The *Journal of Forecasting* publishes technical articles on virtually every technique [see also (2, 20, 21)]. The most-used long-term forecasting methodologies fall into six categories: trend projections, econometric projections, end-use analysis, combined approaches, systems dynamics, and scenario analysis. Each approach reflects a certain world view, which is often embodied in hidden assumptions. We describe these approaches and illustrate them with examples.

Forecasting is impossible in the absence of some sort of (explicit or implicit) view of how the part of the world of interest works. Even the simplest approaches to forecasting require deciding which variables to use. Energy use might be hypothesized to evolve as a function of time alone. A historical graph, on semi-log paper, of energy consumption versus time would show that this relation worked remarkably well over considerable periods. Alternatively, one might hypothesize that energy is linked with economic output. This approach is illustrated in **Figure 4**, below.

It is important to distinguish between approaches based on what is likely, and those based on what is possible. The most common approach is to predict what is likely to happen given continuation of current trends. The second approach is to assess what is possible, given hypothesized societal choices such as changes in government policy (22). Trend projection and econometric methods are typically strongest when used in the first way, whereas end-use, systems dynamics, and scenario analysis are generally most useful in assessing ranges of policy choices.

3.1. Trend Projections

The simplest assumption is that the future will be a smooth extension of the past. Key variables are identified and described in terms of time trends or correlation with other

variables. The simplest and oldest trend approach is drawing straight lines on graph paper. Two-parameter fits can easily be made using linear, log-linear, log-log, or other transformations.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Trend projections rely on empirical correlations. The approach can work well in the absence of structural change (i.e., for short-term forecasts). It is also helpful for business-as-usual forecasts, which generally see the future as a smooth continuation of historical growth rates. Trend projections often assume (sometimes implicitly) the presence of exponential processes. The “exponential assumption” is so deeply embedded that economists often use terms like “steady state” or “constant” to refer to fixed rates of change (e.g., fixed GDP growth rates) rather than fixed levels.

A major weakness in trend-projection approaches is that they discourage searches for underlying driving forces. Typically these models do not include causality and cannot identify emerging contradictions, both of which can be critical in understanding how the future might unfold.

EXAMPLE: DUPREE & WEST For several decades prior to the 1973 OAPEC oil embargo, U.S. energy use was empirically correlated with GDP (gross domestic product). In such forecasts, energy use was projected to continue increasing in lockstep with GDP. The embargo led to increased attention to energy efficiency, destroying the historic correlation. Prior to the 1973 embargo, the last official U.S. government forecast for 2000 (23) projected total primary energy use of 201 exajoules (EJ), based on an expected exponential growth rate of 3.6% per year over the forecast period. This was comparable to growth rates observed in the preceding two decades. Actual primary energy use in 2000 was 103 EJ, so the Dupree & West forecast overestimated by nearly a factor of two. By 1975, Dupree had modified the forecast to reflect the postembargo realities of higher prices and additional government policies (24), so the new estimate came in at 172 EJ in 2000 (still more than a 65% overestimate).

EXAMPLE: STARR **Figure 4** shows an example in which energy use was correlated with GNP (gross national product) (25). The author assumed both that a relation that worked with high precision for several decades would continue and that GNP growth

would follow historic trends. Instead, the U.S. economy's growth rate slowed down, and the correlation with GNP was not sustained in the aftermath of the oil embargos of the 1970s. The actual year-2000 outcome is shown.




Figure 4 An example of energy forecasting assuming continuation of the linear correlation of energy and GNP (gross national product) that occurred in the decades after World War II (25). GNP was forecast assuming the exponential growth rate of that period would continue. After 1973 the historic pattern changed.

EXAMPLE: PRIMARY POWER FRACTION FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION For many decades electricity as a percentage of total energy use increased linearly when plotted on semi-log paper, as shown in **Figure 5** (25:182). In the 1960s Starr used this empirical observation to project high growth in the electricity sector. Because the fraction of energy devoted to making electricity cannot exceed 100%, this graph clearly has a limit, but the article did not consider where this limit might occur. High anticipated electricity growth, combined with optimistic cost estimates for nuclear power, led to massive overestimation

of future demand for electric power generation, and especially for nuclear power plants. Note that the analysis has no economic component whatsoever.




Figure 5 Energy input to electricity as a percentage of total energy (25). Starr assumed that the fraction of primary energy used for electricity generation would continue at the historic exponential growth rate of 2.6% per year. Whereas this trend obviously has a limit at 100%, Starr appeared to believe it could continue until the end of the twentieth century, when the trend suggested 50%. The actual fraction in 2000, 33%, is indicated.

3.2 Econometric Projections

Econometric approaches are a straightforward extension of trend analysis. The approach is made possible by modern computers. Whereas trend analysis is basically a graphical

technique used with one independent variable, computers make it easy to explore relations among many hypothesized causal variables. Dependent variables, such as energy consumed or carbon emissions, may be correlated with independent variables such as price and income.

Econometric analysis relies on regression analysis of historical data and thus assumes structural rigidity in the economy. Sanstad et al. note that some proponents of this method have proclaimed the importance of dynamic market forces, whereas their preferred analytical technique assumes economic rigidity (26).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Just as for trend projections, the strength of econometric techniques is in short-term forecasts, when structural changes and technology adoption are limited in their effects because of the inherent lags in stock turnover. They become less useful for longer time frames, because of the greater likelihood that the past experience on which the econometric parameters are based will no longer reflect future conditions.

Despite their complexity, econometric models do not necessarily outperform the simpler trend-projection approach to regression forecasting. Huss (27) concluded from his analysis of the accuracy of utility forecasts during 1972--1982 that “in all sectors, econometric techniques fail to outperform trend extrapolation/judgmental techniques.” Whereas this result may not be general, it points toward one of the key conclusions of Armstrong (15), that simple models can sometimes yield results as accurate as more complicated techniques.

EXAMPLE: THE HUDSON/JORGENSEN PROJECTION In 1979 Hudson and Jorgensen forecast U.S. primary energy use in 2000. We focus on their forecast because of the authors’ prominence in the energy forecasting community, but we could have picked any number of other econometric forecasts for this example. Theirs was among the several dozen studies summarized in the DOE review (3) and shown in **Figure 1**. Their forecast assumed crude oil prices of roughly \$25/barrel and electricity prices of about 6¢/kWh in 2000 dollars. In fact, these were about the average prices for those energy sources in 2000. Although the projected prices were comparable to actual prices, the total consumption in their forecast was 168 EJ, more than a 60% overestimate.

Sanstad et al. (26) show that 1980 forecasts of this type yield correct year 2000 consumption if one replaces the assumed energy prices with much higher values. That is, agreement can be forced by using energy prices several times higher than those that actually prevailed in 2000. Sanstad et al. argue that the failure of these models results from their inability to treat endogenous technological change. Jorgensen has in recent years been one of the major proponents of incorporating better representations of technological change in such models (28).

3.3. End-Use Analysis

The end-use analysis approach disaggregates the energy sector into technologically distinct subsectors. Total projections are built up from detailed sectoral analyses of various end uses (e.g., lighting, cooling, refrigeration, heating, etc.). This approach begins by asking, “Who uses how much energy for what purposes?” Thus, it first focuses on the services that use the energy, then on the technological characteristics of the devices delivering those energy services (17, 29).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Because these models explicitly represent end uses and the associated technologies, it is relatively easy to incorporate anticipated changes in technology and policy (e.g., automotive, refrigerator, heating plant, or lighting efficiency standards). The explicit characterization of equipment ownership in these models also allows saturation effects to be assessed (e.g., the saturation of residential central air conditioning will not greatly exceed 100% of the homes in any region; automobile mileage is constrained by the amount of time people are willing to spend traveling, etc.). Furthermore, because the approach embodies detailed representations of technologies, end-use analysis can account for physical limits (e.g., Carnot limitations or second-law efficiency constraints).

A downside of the end-use approach may be tendencies among practitioners toward excessive technological optimism or pessimism. Optimism places excess emphasis on new structure-changing technological devices, which may fail technically or in the marketplace. Conversely, pessimism results from preoccupation with incremental improvements to existing technologies, which may lead to overlooking structure-

changing innovations. These approaches often fail to capture the impact of interactions between price and income within the larger economy.

EXAMPLE: ENGINEERING ECONOMIC APPROACHES During the 1970s scientists developed detailed engineering-economic analyses of the potential for energy efficiency. The first major technical study was carried out by the American Physical Society (17). The approach was institutionalized and systematized by analysts at the California Energy Commission and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (29). The general conclusion of essentially all these “bottom-up” analyses was that energy efficiency was far below levels that made economic sense from a societal perspective. The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks gave impetus to a focus on efficiency and resulted in major changes in the relationship between energy use and economic output, changes that remain in place today.

EXAMPLE: MARKET SATURATION LIMITS Compressor-based air conditioning was introduced in the Sacramento, CA valley in the 1960s. By the late 1970s, when nearly all of the households in the Sacramento Valley had air conditioners, an argument based on saturation suggested that substantial future growth of air conditioner electricity demand in this sector and region was unlikely. This reasoning was a central part of the California Energy Commission's (correct) conclusion in the 1970s that electricity growth rates were likely to slow down. In this instance the “limiting case” might have turned out to be misleading had people decided to cool their homes more than in the past, or to build larger houses than anticipated in the business-as-usual forecast. In fact, total electricity use for residential air conditioning did not change much in absolute terms from 1975 to 1999. (30). The results of the technical analysis eventually were embodied in state, and later federal, law. The result was lowered electricity demand and cancellation of orders for many anticipated power plants (29).

3.4. Combined Approaches

Combined approaches employ both regression methods, when trends appear to be robust, and end-use analysis when it appears to provide more insight. This kind of approach is being used increasingly in both industry and government, and especially by the utility industry (27, 31, 32).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Combined approaches bring together engineers and economists, allowing them to draw upon the best analytical tools of each. Typically end-use, engineering-based, approaches are supplemented by parametric models that characterize economic behavior [such as usage elasticities in the Energy Information Administration's National Energy Modeling System (4)].

EXAMPLE: RESOURCES IN AMERICA'S FUTURE The study "Resources in America's Future," published in 1963 by the then-new Resources for the Future (RFF), was a landmark assessment of the demand and supply of all major U.S. resources from 1960--2000 (33). The study combined economic and technical analysis. Economic factors were drawn primarily from U.S. government reports. The authors did a considerable amount of bottom-up trend analysis, supplemented by their professional judgment. Some assumptions are grounded in the laws of thermodynamics, but most energy technologies are so far from fundamental limits that these laws provided minimal constraint. Rather, technological innovation and human behavior were the dominant factors, and these factors proved hard to anticipate.

The study's lead author, Hans Landsberg, revisited the report two decades later (34). His perspective was philosophical: "[O]ne is a captive of the time of writing or calculating, typically without realizing it." In his retrospective review Landsberg remarked on the consequences of the failure to anticipate the oil embargos of the 1970s (illustrated in **Figure 6**). The 1960--1980 period covers the embargo of the 1970s, which the 1963 study did not anticipate. Actual energy growth was higher than the RFF forecast from 1960--1970 and slowed dramatically thereafter. The RFF study showed no such "break-point." It assumed steady growth at a rate that led, fortuitously, to about the right outcome in 1980. The RFF forecasts become increasingly high in the 1980--2000 period as actual energy use continued to lag projected use (141 EJ primary energy demand in 2000 in the "medium" projection versus 103 EJ actual).




Figure 6 Schematic diagram illustrating how a study done two decades earlier (*Resources in America's Future*) correctly predicted energy use in 1980, owing to compensating errors. The forecast energy growth rate was too low in the pre-embargo years, but the oil embargos of the 1970s led to a reduction in actual growth rate. The figure is reproduced from Landsberg's article (34).

3.5. Systems Dynamics (Bucket Models)

The systems dynamics approach models engineering, social, and economic systems as combinations of reservoirs (buckets) that can accumulate and discharge quantities of interest (such as energy, population, and money). Flow paths, often representing nonlinear rate processes, link the reservoirs, creating feedback loops that define coupled sets of first-order nonlinear differential equations (18). The modeling technique emphasizes dynamics and identification of key driving variables. Once a model's structure is fixed, it is exercised by varying parameters and driving forces (13, 14, 35, 36).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Systems dynamics forces precise specification of assumptions. It avoids the almost automatic incorporation of exponential growth so characteristic of the top-down econometric and bottom-up end-use approaches. Exponential growth, when it occurs, always results from specific positive feedback mechanisms. Systems dynamics requires the modeler to identify the feedback path in order to obtain exponential growth (or decay).

Systems dynamics approaches to energy modeling have not been widely used for policy work, though they have been extensively used in university courses. Typically the approach has been applied at high levels of aggregation and abstraction. Systems dynamics modelers in the field of energy have not generally incorporated the wealth of detailed engineering, economic, and demographic data sets developed by the other approaches. Systems dynamics has been extensively used in other areas such as fisheries depletion and predator-prey relations (14).

EXAMPLE: LIMITS TO GROWTH The Limits to Growth study (11) was initiated in 1968, and the controversial results, first published in 1972 (a year before the 1973 OAPEC oil embargo), attracted enormous attention from the press and the policy community (37, 38). The report was reissued with commentary about its history on its twentieth anniversary (39). "Limits to Growth" employed a classic bucket model approach. It focused on population increases, resource depletion, and decreasing productivity owing to environmental pollution.

Criticisms of this model centered on its use of finite reservoirs (buckets) of fossil fuels. Models assuming that resources are finite (i.e., without possibility of substitution or technological change) inevitably predict trouble as the buckets empty. In the "Limits to Growth" world technology and policy can only affect the rates at which the buckets empty. As the models were analyzed it became clear that modification to include innovation and substitution removed the tendency of the models to predict economic and ecological collapse. Cole et al. (38:41) summarized this problem as follows:

One of [the Limits to Growth model's] main modes of 'collapse' is resource depletion [caused by] the assumption of fixed economically-available resources, and of diminishing returns in resource technology. Neither of these assumptions is historically valid... That technical change will slow down because of the diminishing opportunities for labor-saving innovations is a highly debatable assumption.

Despite its shortcomings, the "Limits to Growth" study brought systems analysis into the energy policy arena during the 1970s. The issues raised remain hotly debated to this day.

The "Limits to Growth" study was by no means the first in which a model was based on finite resources. In 1865 Jevons wrote a classic study of the energy future of England (1), from which the quote at the beginning of this article is taken. Jevons observed that because coal was England's major energy resource, and detailed geological research had characterized its size, England had but two choices: to burn the coal quickly and go out in a blaze of glory or to burn it slowly and eventually become a dying ember. The discovery of oil, along with other technological developments, falsified Jevons' pessimistic view. Nevertheless, the work is an important precursor to modern systems dynamics techniques and is considered so important by the economics community that on its centennial it was reprinted in its entirety.

3.6. Scenario Analysis

The term "scenario" is taken from a Hollywood approach in which story lines are worked out descriptively and characterized on story boards. It was introduced as a forecasting tool by Herman Kahn. Scenarios are descriptive conceptions of possible energy futures. The descriptions can be fleshed out to any degree, including numerical analysis. For an excellent discussion of the scenario process see Schwartz (40).

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES A scenario approach helps make assumptions explicit. At its best, scenario analysis can stimulate users to consider possibilities they had not conceived of before. The quality of the scenarios depends critically on the expertise and wisdom of the scenario-building team. The best scenarios highlight the possibility of structural changes.

Scenarios are weak when they assume without careful reflection that the key drivers of the analysis will continue unchanged indefinitely.

EXAMPLE: THE SHELL "RIVER OF OIL" SCENARIOS During the 1960s a group at the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation, under the leadership of Pierre Wack, used scenario analysis as a vehicle for communication within the organization (41, 42). The driving metaphor, the "river of oil," portrayed the company as floating down that river (**Figure 7**). Scenarios ranged from optimistic (trouble-free continued expansion of production) to pessimistic (political limitation on production, industry restructuring). Optimistic scenarios were portrayed as smooth spots on the metaphorical river, and pessimistic

scenarios were described as rapids or waterfalls caused by technical constraints, economic difficulties, or political tensions. The most important prospective tension identified in the scenarios was the growing market power of a few oil-producing nations, especially Saudi Arabia.




Figure 7 The "river of oil" metaphor used by the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation prior to the first oil embargo of 1973 [redrawn from (42)]. The metaphor proved helpful in preparing the company for the embargo.

The educational process engendered by this exercise made Shell managers sensitive to possible surprises, and it allowed the company to respond more readily after the 1973 OAPEC embargo. The energy scenario analysis approach pioneered at Shell continues to be used successfully by the Global Business Network. For example, a 1990 Global Business Network scenario included a pessimistic forecast emphasizing Middle-East terrorism that seems remarkably prescient today (43).

EXAMPLE: SEVEN TOMORROWS This highly readable set of scenarios was a product of the futures group at SRI International (44). Seven futures were described in story form, and each was fleshed out with numerical estimates for key variables (energy, GNP, population, etc.). The authors were well aware that events they could not plausibly foresee might upset all their intellectually defensible scenarios. They addressed this inevitable shortcoming by including an implausible scenario, "apocalyptic transformation, in which a remarkable individual emerged in the American West preaching a gospel of low impact values. His message resonated, and the structure of the

nation changed.” This type of thinking can broaden views and may help the next generation of forecasters avoid the kinds of embarrassments exemplified by **Figure 1**.

EXAMPLE: SOFT ENERGY PATHS Lovins' "soft paths" were designed to argue that a low-energy future for the United States was feasible (45, 46). The approach posited a scenario based on the concept of unexplored options (the road not taken) and argued that we would be better off if we would take it. Lovins’ qualitative numerical estimates of energy use were below those of almost all other forecasts and turned out to have been remarkably accurate. His goal was to make the case that technical advances would allow the nation to shift away from historic trends of an ever more fossil- and nuclear-based energy supply and toward renewables. His scenario (**Figure 8**) hits energy use at the end of the twentieth century almost exactly. However, it shows energy use decreasing, whereas use in the United States actually increased by 1.7% per year, from 87 EJ in 1990 to 103 EJ in 2000. The original figure includes supply mixes, with a focus on renewables. The year-2000 scenario (and actual) supply mixes were oil/gas 26% (63%), coal 23% (22%), nuclear 0% (22%), and renewable 26% (7%).




Figure 8 The soft path scenario. Simplified from Lovins (45). Actual energy use in 2000 is shown. This scenario was impressionistic but was driven by a large number of engineering and economic calculations about the potential for efficiency increases and for renewable supply.

4. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

The best forecasts change thinking and guide policy or action. Naturally, questions arise about the risk of misjudgments and errors arising from forecasts and how to manage these risks (19, 47). The discipline of understanding, assessing, and managing risk is a broad arena called “risk analysis.” This discipline is relatively young, having been developed mostly in the past half century. It encompasses the following components:

- probabilistic risk assessment,
- generation of options to reduce risk, and
- evaluation of costs and benefits of risk-reduction strategies.

Classically, probabilistic risk assessment attempts to evaluate risk as the expected value of an undesirable consequence. This evaluation considers the following sequence of questions: (a) What, specifically, can go wrong? (b) How likely is it to go wrong in this particular way? c) What are the consequences of it going wrong in this way? The “total risk” is the product of items (b) and (c) summed over all the possible items in category (a).

The consequences of a particular failure must be measured in units appropriate to the risk being evaluated. For public health this might be excess annual deaths per million population, whereas for environmental issues it might be number of species driven to extinction annually. For financial calculations it could be the net present value of loss; for genetic impacts it could be mutations. The way in which the results are framed is enormously important. Framing affects the way in which results are perceived and can have great impact---both positive and negative---on credibility. For example, people tend to be more risk-averse in situation in which they stand to lose a lot than in a situation in which they stand to gain a lot (48--51). People tend to be more tolerant of voluntarily chosen risks than of risks forced upon them (52, 53).

Most forecasting exercises do not lend themselves directly to risk analysis. The consequences of the forecast (or of any actions based on the forecast), rather than the forecast itself, are the proper subject of risk and uncertainty analysis. However, placing uncertainty bounds on long-term energy forecasts is particularly difficult, because the models are not validatable, as discussed in Section 1.

Most of the time the forecasting team can do no better than to bracket what they think is likely to take place. Upside and downside risks may differ vastly in cost and consequence. Small-probability, high-consequence outcomes tend to be viewed by the public very differently from large-probability, low-consequence outcomes, even though the risk-analysis framework treats the two cases as identical if the cost (probability times consequence) is identical.

An additional difficulty in assessing the risk associated with policies based on forecasts is that experts usually cannot evaluate the probability that a forecast was based on a flawed model (i.e., the model completely missed some crucial factor or mechanism). In modeling parlance this is called “model mis-specification” or “conceptual model misfit.” In addition, the mindset of the modelers can make the team complacent about the risk of such conceptual misfits in their models.

For example, in 2000--2001 California had numerous unanticipated electrical outages. Much blame was placed on the California Energy Commission (CEC) for failing to anticipate electricity demand growth. The CEC recently examined the accuracy of their electric forecasts dating back to 1988 and found that they generally *overestimated* peak load (54). This indicates that the growth in demand was not unanticipated and that their models did not suffer from large conceptual misfits. Moreover, the CEC load forecasts were generally off by 5% or less (3000 MW or less in absolute terms) from the actual statewide peak load.

The conceptual misfit came into play in the mental models of participants in the California power market in 2000 and 2001. Virtually no one expected a combination of (a) a dry winter in the North West United States, reducing the hydroelectric power available for export to California; (b) increases in populations and power consumption in neighboring states, leaving less power for export to California; (c) many unscheduled and concurrent shut downs of power plants; (d) California utilities forced to bid on the spot market for electricity; (e) lack of price signals to electricity consumers, because they continued to receive power at earlier (low) fixed prices; and (f) potential for market manipulation by some of the major suppliers owing to loopholes in the deregulation process and rules. These factors were ignored by market participants before the crisis, but they proved decisive in driving events during it.

Another type of major risk is that the analysis may be framed from a particular vantage point, thereby leaving out alternative perceptions. The above discussion, for example, omits all mention of where new power plants might be sited. Proposed sites have often been in low-income regions, or in regions with minority populations. Proposals that seem obviously unobjectionable to the group making them---often the dominant socio-economic group---have often come under attack from other groups that consider themselves disenfranchised. Thus, the apparently technical field of risk assessment can have significant or even dominant value components. Embedded values can be hidden so deeply---or so generally accepted among analysts and decision-makers---that even the authors of the reports are unaware of the values they have included. This is a primary reason why analysis should be undertaken independently by several groups with different world views and why users of analysis should cast their nets wide.

5. HOW FORECASTS ARE PERCEIVED: QUALITY, ATTENTION, AND IMPACT

The technical quality of an analysis does not assure impact. Energy forecasts are carried out for a variety of reasons. They are commonly released in complex, sometimes sharply polarized, political environments with contending interests, sometimes with the ruling political mindset already made up. Greenberger et al. reviewed 14 major energy studies undertaken in 1972--1982 (5). They found 9 to be highly controversial and politicized in their execution, reception, or use [for study citations see (5)]. The Ford Energy Policy project, initiated in 1972 and released in 1974, called forth plaudits as well as resentment and antagonism owing to its conclusions emphasizing the need for energy conservation to be driven by regulatory measures (55, 56). The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) was stunned by the criticism of its first report (ERDA-48) released in 1975, which slighted conservation options and adopted a supply focus.

In 1977, the year of the incoming Carter administration, the outgoing ERDA produced its most comprehensive study, the Market Oriented Program Planning Study. Unexpectedly to the ERDA, this study became the center of a highly publicized conflict with the new administration over estimates of future gas supply. The classified CIA study completed in April 1977 on the international energy situation buttressed (fortuitously) the

Carter administration's energy position so well that most of it was declassified with alacrity and released to the public with great publicity, developments that stunned the CIA's own analysts. The released study became controversial and was savagely attacked for tailoring its conclusions, yet the CIA analysts had no prior idea of the central role their report would be selected to play in supporting Carter's National Energy Plan.

Sometimes the media attention focuses on a misunderstood or dramatic (but possibly minor) aspect of a study and virtually ignores the more substantial conclusions. The media coverage of WAES (Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies) report in May 1977 emphasized looming shortages without making a distinction between long-term supply/demand imbalances that could be managed by gradual market adaptation and short-term overnight shortages that would cause long lines at gas pumps. It was a major disappointment to WAES members, who regarded their study as "a call for action, not a cry of despair." Another WAES disappointment was the failure of the study to reach the highest levels of the government. Carter never invoked the WAES study to support his policies---he invoked the CIA study that had arrived at a more opportune time, one month earlier. The Ford-MITRE study garnered little media attention, but was highly influential, as some of the study's participants assumed important roles in the administration and put into effect some of the study's main recommendations.

Technical quality, attention, and impact are subjective evaluations for any energy study. However, it is possible to gauge a measure of these attributes by conducting surveys of energy experts to seek their assessments of selected energy forecasts. Greenberger et al. systematically surveyed close to 200 members of what they call the "energy elite" for their assessment of 14 energy studies from 1972--1980 (5). They used an "attitude" survey of the experts to divide them according to their allegiance to one of the two core viewpoints. One group, labeled "traditionalist," was growth oriented, favored nuclear power, believed in deregulation and the market's ability to efficiently allocate resources, and was skeptical about the near-term promise of solar energy. The other group, labeled "reformist," had great sensitivity to environmental concerns, favored vigorous enforcement of environmental protection laws and promotion of a resource-conserving ethic, and was troubled about the implications of today's energy decisions for

future generations. This group opposed primary reliance on nuclear power and favored greater emphasis on renewables such as solar and biomass.

Each participant was asked to rate each study from the perspective of analytical strength, attention (from the media), and impact, assigning letter grades from A (highest) to E (lowest). Grades from within each group were averaged. As one would expect, the assessments are distinctly different across the two groups. [Table 1](#), reproduced from Reference 5, summarizes the survey results for 12 energy futures studies.

TABLE 1 Assessment of 12 energy futures studies from the 1970s by two groups of energy experts with different viewpoints about renewable and traditional energy systems. The survey was carried out by Greenburger et al. (5) and is discussed in Appendix A of their book.

Study	Quality ^a		Attention ^a		Influence ^a	
	Trad.	Refor.	Trad.	Refor.	Trad.	Refor.
Ford Energy Policy Project	D	A-	A	B	A	A-
Project Independence Report	C	E	B	B	C	D
ERDA-48 and ERDA 76-1	D	E	D	C	D	D
MOPPS	C	D	D	D	E	E
Ford-MITRE Study	B	B	C	D	A	A-
Lovins "soft paths"	E	A-	A	A	A	A-
WAES Study	C	B	C	C	C	B
CIA assessment of int'l energy	C	B	B	B	B	A
CONAES	B	C	C	C	D	D
Stobaugh and Yergin	D	A	A	A	A	A
RFF-Mellon Study	A	B-	D	D	D	E
Ford-RFF Study	A	A	D	D	D	C

^aParticipants assigned letter grades to each study, from A (highest) to E (lowest).

Trad., traditionalist group; Refor., reformist group (see text for details); ERDA, Energy Research and Development Administration; MOPPS, Market Oriented Program Planning Study; MITRE Corporation; WAES, Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies; CONAES, National Academy of Sciences Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Strategies; RFF, Resources for the Future

One major theme that emerges from this study is that the interviewees' assessments differed enormously regarding quality and influence, and that there was little correlation between the two. The survey authors observed that "studies generally regarded high in quality tend to be non-controversial and integrative in nature. In reflecting ideas already known and accepted, they are not as likely to attract attention and exert influence (other

things being equal) as studies with striking and fiery conclusions” (5). Another theme is that the assessment of analytical strength is correlated with the views of the reviewers. The Lovins, Ford Energy Policy Project, and Stobaugh and Yergin studies show the extremes most clearly. Both found favor with reviewers favoring renewables, whereas analysts who preferred traditional energy systems such as coal and nuclear power found them technically flawed.

Views on study quality were influenced by points of view. Greenberg et al. (5:75) found that energy policy analysts and policymakers who favored nuclear power (traditionalists) disliked both the methodology and the conclusions of the analysts who argued for the feasibility of demand reduction. Those characterized by Greenberger et al. as reformists were equally critical of the analysis of the traditionalists.

Little has changed in the intervening quarter century. Precisely the same split over precisely the same issues is occurring today in the debate over the Bush Administration energy program.

6. OBSERVATIONS

We summarize here the main lessons gleaned from the above reports, supplemented by our own experience.

6.1. Document Assumptions

The importance of clear and complete documentation to successful forecasting and scenario design cannot be overestimated. Instead of burying analytical assumptions and value judgments in “black box” models, as is so often done, it is essential that all assumptions be recorded in a form that can be evaluated, reproduced, and used by others. The uncertainties in predicting the future are vast, and making assumptions for the most uncertain variables is often the best we can do. Unless those assumptions are explicit, however, others can’t evaluate their reasonableness, and one can’t credibly claim to be doing anything akin to science. It is for this reason that simpler and more transparent models are often superior in accuracy and usefulness to large and complex ones, because the simpler models are more amenable to peer review of underlying data and assumptions.

Documentation and simple explanations lend credibility to any intellectual effort. They also acknowledge the previous work of others and allow readers to follow thought processes (they also allow authors to recreate their thinking months after they have achieved some conceptual breakthrough). Any competent analyst ought to be able to recreate an analysis from the documentation provided, and the original author should be able to do the same more quickly than others can. Finally, the process of documenting one's results can help one check those results and ensure accuracy.

The importance of transparency of models cannot be overestimated. A model that the audience can actually grasp is inherently more persuasive than a “black box” that no one outside of a small circle of analysts understands. Transparent models for which the input data and assumptions are also well documented are even more compelling but are, sadly, all too rare.

6.2. Link the Model Design to the Decision at Hand

Thousands of person-hours are wasted each year because people asking for forecasts have no clear idea of what decision they are trying to influence or who will make that decision. No forecasting exercise should be undertaken without clearly defining the audience and the decision they will be called upon to make. What decisions are being considered? Who will make them, and when? Answering these questions can allow for more effective use of forecasting resources.

6.3. Beware of Obsession with Technical Sophistication

Accurate data compilation and careful scenario creation are more important to achieving forecasting success than are complex programming or esoteric mathematics. As discussed above, there is no evidence that more complex models are any more accurate in forecasting the future than are simpler models.

Simple and transparent models, properly used, can be immensely powerful. Analysts at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) found this out to their chagrin when Will Keepin, a visiting scholar at IIASA, was able to almost exactly reproduce the results of a multiyear, multimillion dollar study using some of the study's key input assumptions and a hand calculator (57, 58). Keepin showed that the study's results followed directly from the input assumptions. He concluded that the study's projections of future energy supply “are opinion, rather than credible scientific analysis,

and they therefore cannot be relied upon by policy makers seeking a genuine understanding of the energy choices for tomorrow.”

Beware of big complicated models and the results they produce. Generally they involve so much work to keep them current that not enough time is spent on data compilation and scenario analysis. Morgan & Henrion, in their book *Uncertainty*, devoted an entire chapter to such models and began by summarizing this fundamental truth:

There are some models, especially some science and engineering models, that are large or complex because they need to be. But many more are large or complex because their authors gave too little thought to why and how they were being built and how they would be used (59:289

Such large models are essential only for the most complex and esoteric analyses, and a simpler model will usually serve as well (and be more understandable to your intended audience).

Do not be too impressed by a model's complexity. Instead, ask about the data and assumptions used to create scenarios. Focus on the coherence of the scenarios and their relevance to your decisions, and ignore the marketing doublespeak of those whose obsession with tools outweighs their concern with useful results.

6.4. Watch Out for Discontinuities and Irreversibility

One of the biggest unsolved issues in forecasting relates to the treatment of discontinuities. In the analysis of climate change, for example, many climate models assume linear responses to perturbations in greenhouse gas concentrations.

Unfortunately, there is an unknown nonzero probability that the climate system may respond in a discontinuous manner to rapid changes in greenhouse gas concentrations. For example, there may be thresholds beyond which the climate “snaps” to a new equilibrium level that is far from the current one, which could include substantially different ocean circulation and temperature patterns (60--62). Such discontinuities are inherently difficult or impossible to predict, but they remain important to consider, particularly when they might lead to large, irreversible, or catastrophic impacts (63:93, Ch. 19).

6.5. Do Not Assume Fixed Laws of Human Behavior

A common failing afflicting even sophisticated analysts is that they seek immutable laws of human behavior, much as the physicist discovers physical laws through experiment. Such generalizations about human and economic systems often fail because these systems are adaptable in ways that physical systems are not. Policy choices affect how the future unfolds, and parameters that embody historical behavior are bound to lead us astray whenever a forecast relies on those parameters to forecast far into the future (64). Assuming that human behavior is immutable will inevitably lead to errors in forecasting, no matter which kind of modeling exercise you undertake.

Modelers often create forecasts assuming that key input parameters will be similar to their historical values, even when exploring futures that are unlike anything that has ever happened before. This error is particularly egregious for forecasts that look many decades ahead, and can lead to colossal errors.

Most economic forecasting models embody historical experience through relationships that are derived statistically and then use those relationships to forecast the future. These models are often used to assess the potential effects of proposed changes in government policy or business strategy. The fact that these models embody history does not mean they can give an accurate picture of a world in which the fundamental relationships upon which they depend are in flux (65).

At a minimum, if the statistically derived relationships embedded in such a model are the very ones that would be affected by choices or events, then those relationships must be modified in the analysis. For example, after the OAPEC embargo of 1973 energy efficiency became important; energy growth and electricity growth rates dropped dramatically. Forecasts that assumed continuance of historic relations between economic and energy growth were grossly wrong. If society decides that climate change is sufficiently threatening that large-scale preventive action is required, such action will represent a similarly large change in historical patterns.

Many prominent forecasters continue to fall prey to the pitfalls described above. The world in which policies and technologies are adopted is one governed by increasing returns to scale, institutional change, and path dependence (66, 67). Forecasts that do not

account for the dynamic nature of human behavior and technology adoption in characterizing these effects are bound to miss the mark.

6.6. Use Scenarios

If forecasts are part of your planning process, do not rely on only one. Use a set of forecasts or scenarios to explore the future (40, 66, 68, 69). Schwartz's examples of scenario analysis typically have only a small quantitative component, but many other futurists err by focusing too much on the mechanics of forecasting and quantitative analysis (e.g., on particular modeling tools and techniques) and far too little on careful scenario development. Quantitative analysis can lend coherence and credence to scenario exercises by elaborating on consequences of future events, but modeling tools should support that process and not drive it.

In the face of inevitably imperfect forecasts, the most important way to create robust conclusions is to create many well-considered scenarios. No credible analysis should rely on just one or two forecasts. It is also important to look at projections undertaken by different groups, using a variety of techniques, and funded by organizations with different goals.

Vary key factors, and investigate which of them to ignore and which to dissect further. All forecasts are wrong in some respect, but if the process of designing them teaches you something about the world and how events may unfold, creating them will have been worth the effort.

6.7. Use Combined Approaches

In his analysis of the accuracy of time-series techniques by electric utility load forecasters, Huss (31) concludes, “combination forecasts seemed to outperform all other time series techniques tested. These techniques seem to be able to take advantage of the best characteristics of all techniques which comprise the combination.” Combining different approaches allows biases in one technique to offset biases in other techniques (15, 19, 21).

6.8. Expect the Unexpected and Design for Uncertainty

Naturally, questions arise about the risks of misjudgments and errors resulting from forecasts and how to manage these risks (70, 71). One approach is to identify and adopt

strategies that are robust in the face of the inevitably imperfect and uncertain forecasts. For example, several computer companies have moved to "build-to-order" manufacturing, which allows them to assemble computers as requested by customers. This strategy reduces dependence on forecasts but introduces other challenges in manufacturing (which are surmountable using current technology). This same lesson applies equally well to other such decisions: If the key variables are difficult or impossible to foresee, then use scenario analysis to evaluate the possible outcomes (47), assess the situation from multiple perspectives (72), analyze the uncertainties using statistical techniques and formal risk assessment where appropriate, and adopt strategies that are less dependent on forecasts. Also consider using concepts like the precautionary principle (73, 74) as risk minimization tools.

6.9. Communicate Effectively

Forecasts can be technically strong but can fail to influence their target audience because of poor communication of the results. Conversely, a forecast that is not technically sophisticated but that is communicated effectively can sometimes be influential in spite of its inherent weaknesses. A forecast that is successful for one group may be a total failure for another. The way in which the results are framed can be enormously important to a study's credibility and influence (48--51, 75).

In the Greenberger et al. (5) study discussed in Section 5 they note that over time some studies that were initially highly controversial for both technical and policy reasons became more widely accepted. An example is the Ford Energy Policy Project (55), about which Greenberger et al. wrote, "Its heresy became the new orthodoxy within four years." Not surprisingly, these changes did not come about passively. The authors of these studies engaged in vigorous and effectively communicated defense of their findings. A similar observation applies to Lovins' early soft path analysis. Lovins' prolific, effectively communicated, and highly documented defense of his study is contained in the proceedings of a U.S. Congressional hearing (which also included attacks on his views) (76, 77)

When creating a forecast leave enough time to craft an effective summary of the results in a form that your intended audience will find compelling. The time spent will pay off in greater influence in policy debates.

6.10. Be Modest

We need to be humble in the face of our modest abilities to foresee the future (21, 71, 78). This caution is especially warranted when assessing effects of technological choices on the environment, as discussed above, but it applies equally well to most energy forecasts. Fundamental limitations on our ability to foresee consequences has important implications for the ways we use forecasts in our planning.

Reading some old writings is both instructive and humbling. We have already noted Jevons' (1) book exploring the prospect of England's running out of coal. In 1893 The World Columbian Exposition was held to celebrate the technological prowess of the time (79:226). Great thinkers of the day were asked to prognosticate about the next hundred years and were consistently off the mark. George Westinghouse, founder of Westinghouse and inventor of the modern compressed air train brake, wrote that trains were unlikely ever to go faster than 30 miles per hour. He saw this as no problem, however, because there was no need to go faster.

A century ago, H.G. Wells (80) departed from his traditional science fiction writing and wrote a book expressing his personal views as to how the world might unfold during the twentieth century. He thought aircraft might have a marginal role by the end of the twentieth century, thereby totally overlooking the role they were to play in World War I, only a dozen years ahead. However, he foresaw with unbelievable prescience the coming of freeways and the age of the automobile.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The question of how to improve forecasts is more than an academic one. It affects any number of critical public policy debates that the world must confront in the coming decades, including climate change, population growth, the AIDS crisis, and the growing gap between rich and poor.

Viewed in terms of forecast accuracy, the forecasts summarized in **Figure 1** did not do well. Might it be possible to do better today? Two decades ago Ascher warned,

[F]orecasting theorists have not confronted the cold fact that there are no decent guidelines for selecting the appropriate forecasting method from among the great diversity of possibilities. Via hindsight they have demonstrated that particular

approaches would have been appropriate for specific technological patterns, but this in itself does not establish what sorts of approaches, growth models, or formulae should be applied to current problems... (21:125)

Ascher was optimistic about improvements in short-term forecasting but believed long-term forecasting techniques were unlikely to become more accurate owing to rapid and unanticipated changes in society as a whole (21:210--211). The main reason is that time- and context-invariant statements about the accuracy of different long-run forecasting methods for energy, population, and economic activity will likely fall prey to the inherent unpredictability of pivotal events such as the 1973 oil shocks. Whereas people could predict that something like the oil shock might happen (the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation did), no one at that time could have anticipated with certainty that it would happen, or when it would happen. The same holds true for the Great Depression in the 1930s (81) and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Such events are beyond human ability to foresee, but they affect how the future will evolve.

Forecasters tend to be prisoners of their own world view and tend to take too narrow a view of the possibilities for change. Forecasters are human and belong to human institutions. More often than we would like to believe, forecasts are unduly influenced by the particular perspective of the sponsoring institution, and perspectives alien to that organization are downplayed, misrepresented or ignored.

Although forecasters often portray their advice as totally rational, completely objective, and value free, every human choice embodies values. One purpose of the analysis embodied in forecasts is to support public or private choices; in this context it cannot be "clean" or value free. It can, however, illuminate the consequences of choices so that the people and institutions making them can evaluate the alternative outcomes based on their own values and judgment. Hidden assumptions and value judgments exist in every forecast, but the best forecasters make these explicit, so that users of their work are fully informed.

In significant ways long-term forecasts are getting better. Models that rely principally on correlations are increasingly being challenged. It is unlikely that models exploring energy futures with long-run rising energy prices can plausibly be based on elasticities derived from experience with short-run falling prices. Engineering analysis is

increasingly being used to assess what is feasible and appears to be cost effective, but at the same time there is growing realization that the marketplace is sticky, with transaction costs and institutional resistance often playing dominant roles.

The prospect of global climate change has engendered much new analysis. Many analysts from different backgrounds are involved, collectively bringing to bear a broad set of views. This has led to expanded sets of proposals. The carbon emissions scenarios developed under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) cover a large range (82). To a significant degree they illustrate the extent to which the world's energy future can be one that humans design. Indeed, the IPCC work suggests that the current estimates of uncertainty in human action exceed the uncertainty estimates in the response of the atmospheric system: Uncertainties in future greenhouse gas emissions exceed the uncertainties in the amount of global warming per unit greenhouse gas emitted. In this instance increased acknowledged uncertainty is an indicator of improved methodology.

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