

**Safety Review Committee
May 19, 2006
10:00 AM – 12:00 PM**

Minutes

Committee Member	Representing	Present
Ager, Joel W.	Materials Sciences Division	X
Banda, Michael J.	Computing Sciences Directorate	
Blodgett, Paul M.	Environment, Health and Safety Division	*
Cork, Carl	Physical Biosciences Division	X
Fletcher, Kenneth A.	Facilities Department	
Franaszek, Stephen	Genomics Division	X
Garbis, Carla	Directorate/OCFO/Human Resources	X
Kadel, Richard W.	Physics Division	X
Kennedy, Burton Mack	Earth Sciences Division	X
Lucas, Donald	Environmental Energy Technologies Division	X
Lukens Jr., Wayne W.	Chemical Sciences Division	X
Macchiavelli, Augusto O.	Nuclear Science Division	
Martin, Michael C.	Advanced Light Source Division	X
Seidl, Peter A.	Accelerator & Fusion Research Division	X
Taylor, Scott E.	Life Sciences Division	X
Thomas, Patricia M.	Safety Review Committee Secretary	X
Wong, Weyland	Engineering Division	X

Others Present: *Richard DeBusk (for Paul Blodgett), Michelle Flynn, Howard Hatayama, Carol Ingram, Eugene Lau, Robert Schoenlein, Janice Sexson, John Muhlestein

Chairman's Comments – Don Lucas

The Committee welcomed new member Stephen Franaszek from Genomics Division. Don reminded other new members that they need an official appointment from Dr. Chu. Division Directors should send an e-mail to Don nominating the new representative, and Don will forward the nomination to Dr. Chu.

MESH Status:

Don Lucas sent a memo to the Director of each Division to be reviewed this year announcing the MESH. Team Leaders should follow up with the second memo announcing when the review will be conducted and requesting information. Carol Ingram would like BSO representatives to be invited to observe the review process.

Matrixed Employees:

Human Resources has a definition for “matrixed employee”. We need someone in Human Resources to review safety policies for consistency with HR policies. There is a concern that matrixed supervisors are not always experts in the safety requirements for the types of work their matrixed employees do (e.g. scientists supervising matrixed shop personnel).

Peer Review Update – Howard Hatayama

The final draft of the corrective action plan is being developed. One of the first things that needs to be done is to clearly define “Line Management” and line management responsibilities. There are various types of supervisors, mentors, and PIs. Safety is often implemented primarily by post-docs and graduate students in laser labs and wet labs because they are the most familiar with the systems. The term “PI” is used differently by different divisions, and they are not always LBNL employees. We could get some ideas from LLNL. They have an integration work sheet that defines AI (authorizing individual), RI (responsible individual), and PI (principal investigator). We don’t have a clear definition of to whom safety responsibilities may be delegated. In X-ray authorizations, there is a designated “person-in-charge”. . The term “manager” has a specific meaning in contracts. There may be differences in the chain of command for HR and ES&H responsibilities. There must be a clear line of authority from the Director to each worker. We need to decide how to approach people with joint appointments and people outside the performance review process. The definitions will then be used as a framework to align training needs and integrate safety expectations into the performance review process. Changes to policy will require SRC approval.

Feedback and improvement mechanisms need to be enhanced. There will be more assessments of how well specific EH&S programs function across the Lab. The Integrated Functional Appraisals are being refocused on work authorization compliance to distinguish them from the MESH reviews. There will be changes to the division self-assessment performance criteria. We need mechanisms to review the effectiveness of corrective actions.

Training for managers and supervisors will need to be improved and aligned with performance expectations. Howard will be meeting with Don Lucas to discuss how training can be improved based on feedback from people who take classes.

We need a safety communications strategy and plan that sends consistent messages. We need to reduce the fear of shut-down and build trust in the system to ensure incidents are reported.

We will be looking at work authorization processes. For work controlled at the activity level under “line management authorization”, how formal should the authorizations be?

The Activity Hazard Document (AHD) process is being refined and moved to an on-line process. Hazards should be assessed routinely and effectively.

Howard is working to get LBNL and DOE support and buy-in to the corrective action plan. Representatives of research and operations divisions are being included in developing policies. The Senior Leadership Council is being briefed. Dr. Chu will sign the plan and assign responsibilities for leading implementation of corrective actions. Divisions will need to revise their Integrated Safety Management Plans to conform to the new policies. Associate Lab Directors, Division Directors, and Group Leaders will spread the message. SRC representatives should talk to their division management about our role in making and approving policy.

The plan is also being communicated to DOE. A BSO/DOE validation team will visit LBNL at the end of June. BSO will do an effectiveness review in about 6 months. The Defense Nuclear Energy Safety Board raised concerns about work controls and feedback and improvement mechanisms, and our corrective actions will address these as well as the peer review report findings.

It is hoped that the results of the corrective actions will be reduced anxiety about who is responsible for safety, clear boundaries around authorized work, and responsibility to stop work going outside the bounds. There will be more walk-arounds and communications on the floor. There will be better documentation of hazards, controls, and training requirements for self-authorized work.

Laser Safety Update – Bob Schoenlein

The current AHD renewal policy allows AHDs to be automatically renewed if there is no change in hazards and no increase in hazard level. Small, incremental changes may accrue over time without the AHD being updated. The Laser Safety Subcommittee is recommending that a full review be required at least every 3 years. The issue is more with how the policy is being implemented than the policy itself. Different EH&S AHD review team leaders implement the reviews differently. There has been a lot of recent DOE attention and pressure on AHD renewals. Aundra Richards wants to see current AHDS posted. The Laser Safety Officer should do an inspection of laser systems when AHDs are renewed. This is not required now. LBNL is making an offer to a candidate for the LSO position and we hope to have a new LSO soon. The laser inventory is being updated. We need to ensure Integrated Functional Appraisal teams have the expertise needed to review laser work authorization compliance. At Idaho, the review team leader is an expert use, paid for by operations. LBNL's loss of our expert LSO is an issue. There are about 80 laser AHDs on site. Laser parts are restricted items in procurement, to help keep track of who has laser systems and what changes are occurring. Delays in the change process may be a problem. Every division that has a laser AHD should have a representative on the Laser Safety Subcommittee.

It will be a challenge to integrate new DOE requirements to ensure safety into the MOU for work on the UC campus. DOE wants us to evaluate training and the work

environment. The MOU says LBNL is responsible for training only. We must ensure people are supervised until training is completed. LBNL's LSO will need to either accompany the UC LSO or be able to do independent inspections. UC is sensitive to LBNL imposing safety requirements on campus. LBNL has required a laser safety course, while campus training has been to read procedures and get an eye exam. UC has recently implemented on-the-job training. Can the UC MOU be synchronized with the off-site work policy that is being developed? Our proximity to UC allows greater opportunities for work observation. UC has a significant number of employees working at LBNL. We don't have a good record of who is working on campus. They are mostly post-docs and graduate students. Physics Division is requiring LBNL laser training for people working at CERN. All LBNL employees should take the Job Hazards Questionnaire. Directors can stop unsafe work for LBNL people. We want to discuss these issues further. There are DOE, campus, HR, and legal concerns involved.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:00 PM
Respectfully submitted,
Patricia M. Thomas, SRC Secretary